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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
IN CRITICISM OF MR. H E R B E R T SPENCER'S PRESEN-
TATION OF KANTISM. 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 5 
]\/TR. Herbert Spencer has published in The Popular 
-*•' •*• Science Monthly for August, an essay on the Ethics 
of Kant; a translation of this article had appeared in 
the July Number of the Revue Philosophique, and it 
cannot fail to have been widely noticed. It is to be 
regretted that unfamiliarity with the German lan-
guage and perhaps also with Kant's terminology has 
led Mr. Spencer into errors to which attention is called 
in the following discussion.* 
Mr. Spencer says: 
"If, before Kant uttered that often-quoted saying in which, 
" with the stars of Heaven he coupled the conscience of Man, as 
" being the two things that excited his awe, he had known more of 
"Man than he did, he would probably have expressed himself some-
"what otherwise." 
Kant, in his famous dictum that two things excited 
his admiration, the starry heaven above him and the 
conscience within him, contrasted two kinds of sub-
limity.f The grandeur of the Universe is that of size 
and extension, while the conscience of man commands 
respect for its moral dignity. The universe is won-
derful in its expanse and in its order of mechanical 
* Quotations from Mr. Spencer's essay will be distinguished by quotation-
marks, while those from Kant will appear in hanging indentations. 
t Kant distinguishes two kinds of sublimity: i) the mathematical, and l) the 
dynamical. His definitions are: I) sublime is that in comparison with which 
everything else is small; and 2) sublime is that the mere ability to conceive 
which shows a power of emotion (Gemuth), the latter transcending any meas-
urement by the senses. [1) Erhaben ist, mit welchem im Vcrgleich alles andere 
klein ist. 2) Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu kcinucn ein Vermogen des 
Gemuths beweist, das jeden Maasstab der Sinnc tibei'trifft. Editio Harten-
stein, Vol. V, pp. 257, 258.I 
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6 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
regulari ty; the conscience of man is grand, being in-
telligent volition that aspires to be in harmony with 
universal laws. 
Mr. Spencer continues: 
"Not, indeed, that the conscience of Man is not wonderful 
"enough, whatever be its supposed genesis; but the wonderfulness 
"of it is of a different kind according as we assume it to have been 
"supernaturally given or infer that it has been naturally evolved. 
"The knowledge of Man in that large sense which Anthropology 
"expresses, had made, in Kant's day, but small advances. The 
"books of travel were relatively few, and the facts which they con-
"tained concerning the human mind as existing in different races, 
'' had not been gathered together and generalized. In our days, the 
" conscience of Man as inductively known has none of that univer-
sal i ty of presence and unity of nature which Kant's saying tacitly 
" assumes." 
Mr. Spencer apparently supposes that Kant be-
lieved in a supernatural origin of the human con-
science. This , however, is erroneous. 
Mr. Spencer ' s error is excusable in consideration 
of the fact that some disciples of Kant have fallen into 
a similar error. Professor Adler, of New York, who at-
tempts in the Societies for Ethical Culture to carry 
into effect the ethics of Pu re Reason, maintains that 
the commandments of the ought and " t h e light that 
shines through them come from beyond, but its beams 
are broken as they pass through our terrestrial me-
dium, and the full light in all its glory we can never 
see." 
E th ics based on an unknowable power, is mys-
ticism; and mysticism does not essentially differ from 
dualism and supernatural ism. 
Kant ' s reasoning is far from mysticism and 
from supernatural ism. H e was fully convinced that 
civilized man with his moral and intellectual abilities 
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THF. KTHICS OF KANT. 7 
had naturally evolved from the lower state of an 
animal existence. W e read in his essay, " Presumable 
Origin of the History of Mank ind" (Muthmasslicher 
Anfang der Menschengeschichte. Edi t io Hartenste in , 
Vol. IV, p. 3? [ ) : 
"From this conception of the primitive history of mankind it fol-
lows that the departure of man from the paradise represented 
to him by his reason as the earliest place of sojourn of his 
race, has been nothing else than the transition from the rude 
condition of a purely animal existence to the condition of a 
human being; a transition from the leading-strings of instinct 
to direction by reason, in a word, from the protectorate of na-
ture to a status of freedom." 
The view that the conscience of man is innate, in 
the sense of a non-natural , of a mysterious, or even of 
a supernatural origin, is untenable. Those disciples 
of Kant who entertain such views have certainly mis-
interpreted their great master, and the passages ad-
duced by Mr. Spencer from so many sources a re suffi-
cient evidence of the fact that " there are widely dif-
ferent degrees " [we should rather say kinds] " of con-
science in the different races." Mr. Spencer continues: 
" H a d Kant had these and kindred facts before him, his con-
c e p t i o n of the human mind, and consequently his ethical con-
"ception, would scarcely have been what they were. Believing, 
" a s he did, that one object of his awe—the stellar Universe—has 
"been evolved,* he might by evidence like the foregoing have 
"been led to suspect that the other object of his awe—the human 
"conscience—has been evolved; and has consequently a real 
" nature unlike its apparent nature." * * * "If, instead of assuming 
" that conscience is simple because it seems simple to careless in-
"trospection he had entertained the hypothesis that it is per-
" haps complex—a consolidated product of multitudinous expe-
d i e n c e s received mainly by ancestors and added to by self— 
" h e might have arrived at a consistent system of Ethics." * * * 
* The stellar Universe, of course, has not been evolved; Mr. Spencer means 
that according to Kant's mechanical explanation the planetary systems and 
milky ways of the stellar Universe are in a state of constant evolution. 
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8 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
" In brief, as already implied, had Kant, instead of his incon-
"gruous beliefs that the celestial bodies have had an evolutionary 
" origin, but that the minds of living beings on them, or at least on 
"one of them, have had a non-evolutionary origin, entertained the 
"belief that both have arisen by Evolution, he would have been 
" saved from the impossibilities of his Metaphysics, and the untena-
" bilities of his Ethics." 
Mr. Spencer believes that Kant had assumed con-
science to be " simple, because it seems simple to 
careless introspection." But there is no evidence in 
Kant's works for this assumption. On the contrary, 
Kant reversed the old view of so-called "rational psy-
chology " which considered conscience as innate and 
which was based on the error that consciousness is 
simple. Des Cartes's syllogism cogito ergo sum is 
based on this idea, which at the same time served as 
a philosophical evidence for the indestructibility and 
immortality of the ego. The simplicity of conscious-
ness had been considered as an axiom, until Kant 
came and showed that it was a fallacy, a paralogism of 
pure reason. Dr. Noah Porter has written, from an 
apparently dualistic standpoint, a sketch entitled "The 
Ethics of Kant," in which he says: 
" T h e skepticism and denials of Kant's speculative theory in 
respect to noumena, both material and psychical, had unfortunately 
cut him off from the possibility of recognizing the personal ego as 
anything more than ar logical fiction." 
Kant says in his " Critique of Pure Reason" : * 
" In the internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego 
is but the consciousness of my thought. * * * From all 
this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a 
mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies 
at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition 
of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is 
applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than 
• Translation by J. M. D Meiklejohn, pp. 244, 249. 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 9 
the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which 
therefore the category of substance cannot be applied."* 
Concerning the statement that Kant had believed 
in the non-evolutionary origin of living beings, we 
quote from his essay on The Different Races of Men, 
Chap. I l l , where Kant speaks of " the immediate 
causes of the origin of these different races." He says: 
" The conditions (Gritnde) which, inhering in the constitution of an 
organic body, determine a certain evolutionary process (Aus-
wickelung^) are called, if this process is concerned with par-
ticular parts, germs; if, on the other hand, it touches only the 
size or the relation of the parts to one another, I call it 
natural capabilities (natiirliche Anlagen)."\ 
And in a foot-note Kant makes the following re-
mark: 
"Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science (Naturbeschrei-
bung) and natural history in one and the same sense. But it 
is evident that the knowledge of natural phenomena, as they 
now are, always leaves to be desired the knowledge of that 
which they have been before now and through what succession 
of modifications they have passed in order to have arrived, 
in every respect, to their present state. Natural History, 
which at present we almost entirely lack, would teach us the 
changes that have affected the form of the earth, likewise, 
the changes in the creatures of the earth (plants and an-
imals), that they have suffered by natural transformations 
and, arising therefrom, the departures from the prototype of 
the original species, that. they have experienced. It would 
probably trace a great number of apparently different va-
rieties back to species of one and the same kind and would 
* Compare also Kant's " Prol. zu jeder kUnftigen Metaphysik," § 46. 
t We call attention to Kant's peculiar expression, in this passage, of Aus-
wickelung which has now yielded to the term Entwickelung. 
X Die in der Natur eines organischen KOrpers (Gewachses oderThieres) lic-
genden GrOnde einer bestimmten Auswickelung heissen, wenn diese Aus-
wickelung besondere Theile betrifft, Keime; betriflft sie aber nur die GrOsse 
oder das Verhaltniss der Theile unter einander, so nenne ich sie naiiirlicke 
Anlagen. 
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I O THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural 
Science into a natural system in conformity with reason." * 
Kant has nowhere, so far as we know, made any 
objection to the idea of evolution. But he opposed 
the theory that all life should have originated from one 
single kind. In reviewing and epitomizing Joh. Gottfr. 
Herder's work, " Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit" 
Kant says: 
* * * "Book II, treats of organized matter on the earth. * * * 
The beginnings of vegetation. * * * The changes suffered 
by man and beast through climatic influences. * * * In 
them all we find one prevailing form and a similar osseous 
structure. * * * These transitional links render it not at all 
impossible that in marine animals, in plants, and, indeed, 
possibly in so-called inanimate substances, one and the same 
fundamental principle of organization may prevail, although 
infinitely cruder and more complex in operation. In the sight 
of eternal being, which beholds all things in one connection, 
it is possible that the structure of the ice-particle, whiie re-
ceiving form, and of the snowflake, while being crystal-
lized, bears an analogous relation to the formation of the 
embryo in a mother's womb. * * * The third book com-
pares the structure of animals and plants with the organization 
of man. * * * It was not because man was ordained to 
be a rational creature that upright stature was given him for 
using his limbs according to reason; on the contrary he ac-
quired his reason as a consequence of his upright stature. * * * 
From stone to crystals, from crystals to metals, from metals 
+ Wir nehmen die Benennungen Naturbeschreibung und Naturgeschichte 
gemeiniglich in einerlei Sinne. Ailein es ist klar, dass die Kenntniss der Na-
turdinge, wie siejetzt sind, iramer noch die Erkenntniss von demjenigen wiin-
schen lasse, was sie ehedem gezuesen sind und durch welche Reihe von Ver-
anderungen sie durchgegangen, um an jedem Ort in ihren gegenwartigen Zustand 
zu gelangen. Die Naturgeschichte, woran es uns noch fast ganzlich (ehlt, wilrde 
uns die Veranderung derErdgestalt, imgleichen die der Erdgesch6pfe (Pflan-
zen und Thiere), die sie durch natUrliche Wanderungen (sicl 1 take it as a 
misprint for IVandelungen) erlitten haben, und ihre daraus entsprungenen 
Abartungen von dem Urbilde der. Stammgattung lehren. Sie wUrde ver-
muthlich eine grosse Menge scheinbar verschiedener Arten zu Racen eben-
derselben Gattung zuruckfuhren, und das jetzt so weitlauftigte Schulsystem 
der Naturbeschreibung in ein physisches System fur den Verstand verwandeln. 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. I I 
to plant-creation, from thence to the animal, and ultimately to 
man, we have seen the form of organization advancing, and 
with it the faculties and instincts of creatures becoming more 
diversified, until at last they all became united in the human 
form, in so far as the latter could comprise them. * * * 
As the body increases by food, so does the mind by ideas; in-
deed, we notice here the same laws of assimilation, of growth, 
and of generation. In a word, an inner spiritual man is be-
ing formed within us, which has a nature of its own and 
which employs the body as an instrument merely. * * * 
Our humanity is merely a preliminary training, the bud of a 
blossom to come. Step by step does nature cast off the igno-
ble and the base, while it builds and adds to the spiritual 
and continues to fashion the pure and refined with increasing 
niceness; thus are we in a position to hope from the artist-
hand of nature that in that other existence our bud of hu-
manity will also appear in its real and true form of divine 
manhood." * * * 
[Herder's idea of evolution would stand on the 
whole if his conception of "the spiritual" did not im-
ply a preternatural agent.] 
" T h e present state of man is probably the link of junction be-
tween two worlds. * * * Yet man is not to investigate 
himself in this future state; he is to believe himself into it." 
Kant makes no objection whatever to the evolu-
tionary ideas of Herder. But Herder was not free 
from supernaturalism and from fantastic ideas in 
reference to the future development of man. He had 
not yet dropped the dualistic conception of the 
'duplicity' of man and believed in the immortality of 
a distinct spiritual individual within his body. Kant's 
objection, therefore, is twofold; i) against Herder's 
supernaturalism which leads him beyond this world; 
and, 2) against the descent of all species from one and 
and the same genus. He says: 
" I n the gradation between the different species and indi-
viduals of a natural kingdom, nature shows us nothing else 
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12 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
than the fact that it abandons individuals to total destruction 
and preserves the species alone. * * * As concerns that 
invisible kingdom of active and independent forces, we fail to 
see why the author, after having believed he could confidently 
infer from organized beings, the existence of the rational prin-
ciple in man did not rather attribute this principle directly to 
him merely as spiritual nature, instead of lifting it out of 
chaos through the structural form of organized matter. 
* * * As to the gradation of organized beings, our author 
is not to be too severely reproached, if the scheme has not met 
the requirements of his conception, which extends so far be-
yond the limits of this world; for its application even to the 
natural kingdoms here on earth leads to nothing. The slight 
differences exhibited when species are compared with refer-
ence to their common points of resemblance, are, where there 
is such great multiplicity, a necessary consequence of just this 
multiplicity. The assumption of common kinship between 
them, inasmuch as one kind would have to spring from another 
and all from one original and primitive species, or from one 
and the same creative source (Mutterschoss)—the assumption 
of such a common kinship would lead to ideas so strange that 
reason shrinks from them, and we cannot attribute this idea 
to the author without doing him injustice. Concerning his 
suggestions in comparative anatomy through all species 
down to plants, the workers in natural science must judge for 
themselves whether the hints given for new observations, 
will be useful and whether , they are justified. * * * 
It is desirable that our ingenious author who in the continu-
ation of his work will find more terra firma, may somewhat 
restrain his bright genius, and that philosophy (which consists 
rather in pruning than in fostering luxuriant growth) may 
lead him to the perfection of his labors not through hints but 
through definite conceptions, not by imagination but by ob-
servation, not by a metaphysical or emotional phantasy but 
by reason, broad in its plan but careful in its work." 
Kant rejected certain conceptions of evolution, but 
he did not at all show himself averse to the idea in 
general. He touched upon the subject only incident-
ally and it is certain that he did not especially favor 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 13 
or entertain the belief in a non-evolutionary origin of 
living beings. 
Before proceeding to the main points of his criti-
cism, Mr. Spencer calls attention to what he designates 
as Kant',s abnormal reasoning. Mr. Spencer says: 
"Something must be said concerning abnormal reasoning as 
" compared with normal reasoning." * * * 
" Instead of setting out with a proposition of which the nega-
" tion is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of which the 
"affirmation is inconceivable, and therefrom proceeds to draw con-
" elusions." * * * 
" The first sentence in Kant's first chapter runs thus: ' Noth-
"ing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, 
"which can be called good without qualification, except a Good 
" W i l l . " ' * * * 
" Most fallacies result from the habit of using words without 
"fully rendering them into thoughts—passing them by with recog-
" nitions of their meanings as ordinarily used, without stopping to 
"consider whether these meanings admit of being given to them in 
" the cases named. Let us not rest satisfied with thinking vaguely 
"of what is understood by ' a Good Will,' but let us interpret the 
"words definitely. Will implies the consciousness of some end to 
" b e achieved. Exclude from it every idea of purpose, and the con-
c e p t i o n of Will disappears. An end of some kind being necessa-
" rily implied by the conception of Will, the quality of the Will is 
"determined by the quality of the end contemplated. Will itself, 
' ' considered apart from any distinguishing epithet, is not cognizable 
" by Morality at all. It becomes cognizable by Morality only when 
" i t gains its character as good or bad by virtue of its contemplated 
" end as good or bad." * * * 
" Kant tells us that a good will is one that is good in and for 
" itself without reference to ends." 
It is unfortunate that Mr. Spencer misunderstood 
the first sentence of Kant's book {Grundlegung zur 
Metapliysik der Sitten). Kant does not speak of " a 
good will without qualification," nor does the expres-
sion " without qualification" refer to " a will without 
reference to ends." Kant speaks of good will in 
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14 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
opposition to other good things. Nothing, he says, 
can without qualification {ohne Einschrtinkling) be 
called good, except a good will.* Dr. Porter sums up 
the first page of Kant's essay in the following words: 
" T h e first section of the treatise opens with the memorable 
and often-quoted utterance, that ' nothing can be possibly con-
ceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good 
iwithout qualification, except a good will.' If character is com-
pared with gifts of nature, as intelligence, courage, and gifts of 
fortune, as riches, health, or contentment, all these are defective, 
' if there is not a good will to correct their possible perversion and 
to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adapt it to its end.' \ 
A man who is endowed with every other good can never give 
pleasure to an impartial, rational spectator unless he possesses a 
good will. 'Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispen-
sable condition of being worthy of happiness.' * * * ' Moreover, 
a good will is good not for what it effects but for what it intends, 
even when it fails to accomplish its purposes, * * * as when 
the man wills the good of another and is impotent to promote it, 
or actually effects just the opposite of what he proposes or wills. '" 
In the passages quoted by Dr. Porter, Kant speaks 
of " the end to which good will adapts other goods "; 
and in another passage of the same book, Kant di-
rectly declares that " it is the end that serves the will 
as the objective ground of its self-determination." Mr. 
Spencer must have overlooked these sentences. Kant 
says: 
"The will is conceived as a power of determining itself to action in 
accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a 
power can only be met with in rational beings. Now it is the 
END that serves the will as the objective ground of its self-
determination, and this end, if fixed by reason alone, must hold 
equally good for all rational creatures." 
# # * 
Mr. Spencer interrupts his essay on the Eth ics of 
* The original of the first sentence reads: " E s ist uberall nichts in der 
Welt, ja Oberhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denken moglich, was ohne Ein-
schrnnkung fur gut konnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille." 
t Italics are ours. 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 1 5 
Kant by a digression on Kant's conception of time 
and space. It would lead us too far at present 
if we would follow Mr. Spencer on this ground also. 
A comparison of Spencer's remarks on the subject 
with Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" will show that 
Kant's view of space and time is radically different 
from that view which Mr. Spencer represents as the 
Kantian conception of time and space. 
# 
* * 
Kant rejects the idea that happiness is the end and 
purpose of life and at the same time he declares that 
ethics must be based not on the pursuit of happiness 
but on the categorical imperative or more popularly 
expressed on our sense of duty. 
Mr. Spencer argues: 
" O n e of the proposi t ions conta ined in Kan t ' s first c h a p t e r is 
" t h a t ' w e find tha t the more a cul t ivated reason appl ies itself wi th 
" d e l i b e r a t e p u r p o s e t o t h e en joyment of life and happiness , so 
" much the more does the man fail of t rue sat isfact ion. ' " * * * 
" T h a t which Kan t should h a v e said is tha t the exclusive pur -
" suit of wha t a re dis t inguished as p leasures and a m u s e m e n t s is dis-
a p p o i n t i n g . " * * * 
" I t is not, as Kan t says, gu idance by ' a cul t iva ted r eason , ' 
" w h i c h leads to d i sappoin tment , bu t gu idance by a n uncu l t iva ted 
" r ea son . " 
T h e p a s s a g e q u o t e d b y M r . S p e n c e r f r o m K a n t , 
r e a d s i n i t s c o n t e x t a s f o l l o w s : 
" In the physical const i tu t ion of an organized be ing we take it for 
g ran ted* that no organ for any purpose will be found in it bu t 
• The phrase "we take it for granted" (in the original " nehmen wir es als 
Grundsatz an)" reads in the translation quoted by Mr. Spencer: " we take it as 
a fundamental principle." Mr. Spencer objects to the passage declaring that 
there are many organs (such as rudimentary organs) in the construction of 
organized beings which serve no purpose. This however does not stand in 
contradiction to Kant's assumption that organs of organized beings serve a 
special purpose. The rudimentary organs have under other conditions served 
a purpose for whiph they then were fit and well adapted and are disappearing 
now because no longer used. 
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i 6 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
such as is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose. 
If in a being possessing reason and will, the preservation, 
the prosperity, in a word, the happiness of that being, con-
stituted the actual purpose of nature, nature had certainly 
adopted an extremely unwise expedient to this end, had it 
made the reason of that being the executive agent of its pur-
poses in this matter. For all actions that it had to perform 
with this end in view, and the whole rule of its conduct, would 
have been far more exactly prescribed by instinct, and this 
end would have been far more safely attained by this means 
than can ever take place through the instrumentality of 
reason." * * * 
" As a matter of fact we find that the more a cultivated reason occu-
pies itself with the purpose of enjoying life and happiness, the 
farther does the person possessing it recede from the state of 
true contentment; and hence there arises in the case of many, 
and pre-eminently in the case of those most experienced in the 
exercise of reason, if they are only frank enough to confess 
it, a certain degree of misology or hate of reason; for after 
weighing every advantage that they derive, I will not say from 
the invention of all arts facilitating ordinary luxury, but even 
from the sciences, (which after all are in their eyes a lux-
ury of the intellect,) they still discover that virtually they 
have burdened themselves more with toil and trouble than 
they have gained in point of happiness, and thus, in the end, 
they are more apt to envy than contemn the commoner type 
of men who are more immediately subject to the guidance of 
natural instinct alone, and who do not suffer their reason 
to influence in any great degree their acts and omissions." 
Kant uses the expression " cultivated reason " not 
in opposition to "uncultivated reason," but " t o in-
stinct " as that inherited faculty which teaches a being 
to live in accordance with nature and its natural con-
ditions, without the interference of thought and re-
flection. 
That uncultivated reason would lead to disappoint-
ment, Kant never would have denied. He would have 
added: " It does more, it leads to a speedy ruin." 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 17 
But if reason does not produce happiness, what 
then is the use of reason? Kant answers, reason pro-
duces in man the good will. 
It is reason which enables man to form abstrac-
tions, to think in generalizations and to conceive the 
import of universal laws. When his will deliberately 
and consciously conforms to universal laws, it is good. 
Kant says: 
" Thus will (viz. the good will) can not be the sole and whole 
Good, but it must still be the highest Good and the con-
dition necessary to everything else, even to all desire of hap-
piness." * * * 
" T o know what I have to do in order that my volition be good, 
requires on my part no far-reaching sagacity. Unexperienced 
in respect of the course of nature, unable to be prepared for 
all the occurrences transpiring therein, I simply ask myself: 
Can'st thou so will, that the maxim of thy conduct may become 
a universal law? Where it can not become a universal law, 
there the maxim of thy conduct is reprehensible, and that, 
too, not by reason of any disadvantage consequent there-
upon to thee or even others, but because it is not fit to enter as 
a principle into a possible enactment of universal laws." 
If a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle 
into a possible enactment of universal laws, it will be 
found in harmony with the cosmical laws; if not, it 
must come in conflict with the order of things in the 
universe. It then cannot stand, and will, if persist-
ently adhered to, lead (perhaps slowly but inevitably) 
to certain ruin. 
Concerning the proposition that happiness may 
be regarded as the purpose'of life Kant in his review 
of Herder's "Ideen zur Philosophic der Geschichte 
der Menschheit" Ed. H. IV, p. 190), speaks of the 
relativity of happiness and its insufficiency as a final 
aim of life: 
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i 8 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
* * # .. First of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a 
child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs of 
human history, as well as among all classes and conditions of 
the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in 
exact conformity with the individual's ideas and the degree of 
his habituation to the conditions amid which he was born and 
raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a comparison 
of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence to one class 
of men or to one generation over another. * * * If this 
shadow-picture of happiness. . . .were the actual aim of Provi-
dence, every man would have the measure of his own happi-
ness within him. * * * Does the author (Herder) think 
perhaps that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheite had never 
been visited by more civilized peoples and were ordained to 
live in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come — 
that we could give a satisfactory answer to the question why 
they should exist at all and whether it would not have been 
just as well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep 
ind cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy 
only through pure enjoyment?" 
Concerning the mission or purpose of humanity 
and its ultimate realization, Kant interprets Herder's 
views as follows: 
" I t involves no contradiction to say that no individual member of 
all the offspring of the human race, but that only the species, 
fully attains its mission (Bestimmung). The mathematician 
may explain the matter in his way. The philosopher would 
say: the mission of the human race as a whole is unceasing 
progress, and the perfection (Vollendung) bf this mission is a 
mere idea (although in every aspect a quite useful one) of the 
aim towards which, in conformity with the design of provi-
dence, we are to direct our endeavors." 
We learn from the passages quoted from Kant 
that his idea of good will is neither mystical and su-
pernatural, nor is it vague. It is a conception as logi-
cally and definitely defined as any mathematical defi-
nition. Good will in the sense in which Kant defines 
it, is only possible in a reasonable being by the power 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 19 
of its reason. The good will is the intention of con-
forming to universal principles and thus of being in 
harmony with the All. This good will is the corner-
stone of Kant's ethics; it appears as the categoric im-
perative of duty, so to act that the maxim of one's 
conduct may be fit to become a universal law. It is 
formulated in another passage: " Actsoasif themaxim 
of thy conduct by thy volition were to become a natural 
• law." 
It is easily seen that, in Kant's conception, the 
ought of morals (viz. of the categoric imperative) does 
not stand in contradiction to the must of natural laws. 
Kant's conception is monistic, not dualistic. Kant 
says: 
" T h e moral ought is man ' s inner, necessary volition as be ing 
a m e m b e r of an intelligible world and is conceived by h im as an 
ought only in so far as he considers himself also as a m e m b e r of 
t h e sensory wor ld . "* 
Our way of explaining it would be: Man feel: in 
his activity the categoric imperative as an ought. 
So the snow crystal, if it were possessed of sensation, 
would feel its formation as an "ought." But both 
are, and to an outside observer will appear, as a "must." 
* 
* * 
In the Spencerian system of ethics, which is utili-
tarianism, the moral maxim or the idea of duty is not 
distinguished from the feeling of pleasure or pain 
that accompanies ethical thoughts and acts, and 
their consequences. This lack of distinction induces 
Mr. Spencer to consider man's pursuit of happiness as. 
the basis of ethics. Accordingly the aim of ethics, he 
* Das moralische Sollen ist also ein eigenes nothwendiges Wollen als 
Gliedes einer intelligiblen Welt, und wird nur sofern von ihm als Sollen ge-
dacht, als er sich zugleich wte ein Glied der Sinnenwelt betrachtet. Ed. Har-
tenstein vol IV. p. 303. 
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2 0 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
maintains, is not the performance of duty, not the re-
alization of the good; to the utilitarian this is only the 
means. The end of ethics is the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number. 
It is strange that Mr. Spencer's essay contains a 
passage which, although intended as a point of objec-
tion to Kant, is a corroboration of Kant's ethics, and 
a refutation of Mr. Spencer's own views. While de-
nying the statement that "a cultivated reason, if ap-
plied with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life 
and happiness, will fail to produce true satisfaction," 
Mr. Spencer says: 
" I assert that it is untrue on the strength of personal experi-
e n c e s . In the course of my life there have occurred many in-
" tervals, averaging a month each, in which the pursuit of happi-
" ness was the sole object, and in which happiness was success-
" fully pursued. How successfully may be judged from the fact 
" tha t I would gladly live over again each of those periods 
" without change, an assertion which I certainly cannot make of 
" any portions of my life spent in the daily discharge of duties." 
This statement, if it proves anything, proves that 
happiness is one thing and duty is another; it proves 
that Kant's theory of ethics, which is based on the 
discharge of duty and not on the pursuit of happiness, 
is correct, and that Mr. Spencer's theory which iden-
tifies duty with the pursuit of happiness, is wrong. 
However, we must in this place express our opin-
ion that Mr. Spencer's statement cannot be quite 
correct. The discharge of duty, unpleasant though 
the drudgery part of it may have been, was un-
doubtedly accompanied and followed by a certain sat-
isfaction, which perhaps was less in quantity, but cer-
tainly higher in quality than the pleasure derived from 
the mere pursuit of happiness. And in the valuation 
of the intrinsic and of the moral worth of pleasures, the 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 2 1 
quality alone should be taken into consideration, not 
the quantity. In this sense only can an ethical hedon-
ism or utilitarianism be acceptable. The man whose 
pleasures and pains are of a higher kind, of a nobler 
form, and of a better quality, is morally and generally 
the more evolved man. And then, the basis of ethics 
would be, not so much pleasure or happiness as the 
quality of pleasure or happiness; it would be an as-
piration to evolve toward a higher plane of life, to 
shape our lives in nobler forms, and to enjoy nobler, 
greater, and more spiritual pleasures, or, as Kant says, 
" unceasing progress." 
Mr. Spencer's assertion, if taken in the sense in 
which it stands, is a contradiction of his ethical theory. 
But even if Mr. Spencer had declared that the discharge 
of duty affords a kind of happiness or satisfaction, 
as it truly does, there would still remain a deep gap 
between his and Kant's ethics. Mr. Spencer reduces 
ethics to mere worldly prudence; he says that we 
must do the good in order to be happy, and for the 
sake of its utility, and Kant says we must act so as to be 
in agreement with universal law. Mr. Spencer says : 
" B u t now, supposing we accept Kant's statement in full, 
"what is its implication? That happiness is the thing to be 
"desired, and, in one way or another, the thing to be 
"achieved." * * * 
" An illustration will best show how the matter stands. To a 
" t y ro in archery the instructor says: 'Sir, you must not point 
"your arrow directly at the target; if you do, you will inevitably 
"miss it; you must aim high above the target, and you may then 
"possibly pierce the bull's-eye.' What now is implied by the 
"warning and the advice? Clearly that the purpose is to hit the 
"target. Otherwise there is no sense in the remark that it will 
" b e missed if directly aimed at; and no sense in the remark that 
" t o be hit, something higher must be aimed at. Similarly with 
" happiness. There is no sense in the remark that happiness will 
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22 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
" n o t be found if it is directly sought, unless happiness is a thing 
" t o be somehow or other obtained." * * * 
" So that in this professed repudiation of happiness as an end, 
" there lies the inavoidable implication that it is the end." 
The pursuit of happiness is b}' no means repudi-
ated by Kant as wrong or immoral; it is only main-
tained to be insufficient as a foundation of ethics. 
Kant's remark that happiness will not be found if it is 
directly sought has no reference to his own ethics. 
Kant, speaking from the standpoint of one who takes 
the view of utilitarianism, says that if a cultivated 
reason applies itself to the sole purpose of enjoying life 
and happiness, it will meet with a failure.* 
Any other explanation of the moral ought than that 
from the Good Will, Kant declares to be heteronomy. 
Will would no longer be itself, and the principle of 
action would lie in something foreign to the will. 
Kant says: 
"Wil l in such a case would not be a law to itself; but the object 
by its relation to the will would impose the law upon the 
will." * * • This would admit of hypothetical impera-
tives only: ' ' I ought to do a certain thing, because I want some-
thing else." The moral and therefore categorical imperative, 
on the contrary, says: ' I ought to act so or so, even if I had 
nothingelse in view.' For instance: the hypothetical impera-
tive of heteronomy says: ' I ought not to lie, if I ever wish to 
preserve my honor.' The- categorical imperative says: ' I ought 
not to lie even if it would not in the least bring me to shame.' " 
Mr. Spencer quotes the following passage from 
Kant: 
" I omit here all actions which are already recognized as incon-
sistent with duty, although they may be useful for this or that 
purpose, for with these the question whether they are done 
from duty can not arise at all, since they even conflict with 
it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to duty, 
* The passage referred to is quoted in full on page 16. 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 23 
bnt to which men have no direct inclination, performing them 
because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. 
For in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action 
which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish 
view. It is much harder to make this distinction when the 
action accords with duty, and the subject has besides a direct 
inclination to it. For example, it is always a matter of duty 
that a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced pur-
chaser, and wherever there is much commerce the prudent 
tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for 
every one, so that a child buys of him as well as any other. 
Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make 
us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and 
from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; 
it _s out of the question in this case to suppose that he might 
besides have a direct inclination in favor of the buyers, so that, 
as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one over 
another [!]. Accordingly the action was done neither from 
duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view. 
" O n the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life, and, in 
addition, every one has also a direct inclination to do so. 
But on this account the often anxious care which most men 
take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no 
moral import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no 
doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other hand, if 
adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away 
the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, in-
dignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes 
for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it—not 
from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim has 
a moral worth. 
" T o be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there 
are many minds so sympathetically constituted that without 
any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleas-
ure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight in 
the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But 
1 maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, how-
ever proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no 
true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations" 
(PP 17-19) 
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2 4 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
Kant's metaphysics of ethics is to practical ethics 
what pure mathematics is to applied mathematics, or 
what logic is to grammar. Kant's method of reason-
ing in abstracto everywhere shows the mathematical 
bent of his mind. In a foot-note (Editio Hartenstein, 
IV), p. 258, he says: 
" As pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics 
and pure logic from applied logic, so may the pure philosophy 
(the metaphysics) of ethics be distinguished from the applied 
philosophy of ethics, that is, as applied to human nature. By 
this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical princi-
ples are not based upon the peculiaiities of human nature but 
that they must beexistent by themselves a priori,—whence, 
for human nature, just as well as for any rational nature, 
practical rules can be derived." 
Schleiermacher says: 
" A good is any agreement ("unity") of definite sides [cer-
tain aspects] of reason and nature. * * * The end of ethical 
praxis is the highest good, i. e., the sum of all unions of nature 
and reason. * * * The moral law may be compared to the 
algebraic formula which (in analytical geometry) determines the 
course [path] of a curve; the highest good may be compared to 
the curve itself, and virtue, or moral power, to an instrument ar-
ranged for the purpose of constructing the curve according to 
the formula." (Quoted from a translation of Ueberweg.) 
Kant declares in other passages that in examples 
taken from practical life, it will be difficult to separate 
clearly and unmistakably the sense of duty as the real 
moral motive from other motives, inclinations, habits, 
etc. But such a distinction must be made, if the moral 
value of motives is to be considered in abstracto. 
This is necessary for a clear conception of the essen-
tial features of morality. Mr. Spencer has on other 
occasions highly praised the power of generalization., 
which indeed is fundamentally the same faculty, as 
thinking in abstracto; here, however, he does not follow 
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 25 
Kant's argument, but declares "that the assumed dis-
tinction between sense of duty and inclination is un-
tenable." He says: 
" The very expression, sense of duty implies that the mental 
" s ta te signified is a feeling; and if a feeling it must, like other feel-
1
' ings, be gratified by acts of one kind and offended by acts of an 
"opposite kind. If we take the name conscience, which is equiva-
" lent to sense of duty, we see the same thing. The common ex-
p re s s ions 'a tender conscience,' 'a seared conscience,' indicate the 
"perception that conscience is a feeling—a feeling which has its 
" satisfactions and dissatisfactions, and which inclines a. man to acts 
"which yield the one and avoid the other—produces an incli-
"nation," (p. 476). 
It is quite true that every state of consciousness 
is a feeling, but we can and must discriminate between 
consciousness or feeling and the idea or thought which 
becomes conscious, in which the feeling appears, and 
which is, so to speak, the special form of a certain 
feeling. The consciousness and its special form, the 
feeling and the mental object of feeling, are in reality 
one and the same. Yet they are different and must 
in abstracto be well distinguished. Mr. Spencer's 
method is that of generalization, but generalizing can 
lead to no satisfactory results, if it is not constantly 
accompanied by discrimination. We must generalize 
and discriminate. 
If a certain group of states of consciousness takes the 
form of a logical syllogism, it must not be expected that 
logic will find its explanation in feeling, although it 
cannot be denied that all the states of consciousness 
are feelings. Not the feeling in this case is to be ex-
plained, but logic. In our generalizations we must 
discriminate in abstracto between the feeling and the 
idea which feels. We must positively abstract from 
feeling and cannot consider whether the feeling of log-
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26 THE ETHICS OK KANT. 
ical arguments is pleasant or unpleasant. Mr. Spencer's 
method of explaining ethics, if applied to logic, would 
be as follows: "Man's logical sense is a very complex 
feeling and has developed from simple percepts such 
as can be observed in the lowest animals; percepts 
are a higher evolved form of reactions against irrita-
tions such as take place in protoplasm. The old 
method of explaining logic is that of deduction, mod-
ern logic will be inductive. Formerly pure logic was 
considered as a science a priori; but the evolution-
philosophy shows that logic is developed by steps, 
it appears a priori to the individual now, but it is in 
reality a consolidated product of multitudinous expe-
riences received mainly by ancestors and added to by 
self. Logical sense accordingly finds its explanation in 
most simple feelings. Our conceptions of logically 
incorrect feelings will be more and more avoided be-
cause they will ultimately be found to be unpleasant; 
logical correctness is striven for because of the feeling 
of satisfaction that accompanies the conception of a 
logically correct conclusion." 
Sense is feeling, there can be no doubt. Logical 
sense and mathematical sense are feelings and if a 
person thinks a mathematical axiom or a logical syl-
logism or an ethical maxim, he has a feeling. Logical 
sense of reason is the product of evolution, and it 
cannot be denied either that one man has a more logical 
or mathematical or moral sense than another. But it 
does not follow that an explanation of mathematics, 
or logic, or ethics, must be derived from feeling 
pleasure and pain, or happiness. On the contrary we 
must abstract from feeling altogether and concern 
ourselves with the object of feeling only, which is the 
idea or the special form in which and as which feeling 
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 7, 2015
http://m
onist.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
THE ETHICS OF KANT. 27 
appears. States of consciousness (never mind whether 
they are painful or pleasurable) must be considered as 
moral if their mental object, /'. <?., the idea, the thought, 
the motive, the form in which feeling becomes mani-
fest, is in harmony with the universal order of things. 
* 
* * 
Mr. Spencer declares that the world would be 
intolerable "if Kant's conception of moral worth 
were displayed universally in men's acts." And it 
must be acknowledged that Kant's ethics in their logi-
cal and irrefutable rigidity not only impressed the lit-
erary world of his time with the grandeur and sub-
limity of ethics; Kant's ethics also astounded, and 
overwhelmed his readers with awe. Virtue no longer 
appeared to be the fervid enthusiasm of sentiments; 
it congealed into the cold idea of duty which can 
be fixed in abstract rules and will operate like the cor-
rectly calculated gear of a machine. Objections have 
been raised by some of Kant's own disciples; but it 
must be known that the Kantian view of ethics does 
not suppress feelings, emotions and inclinations, it ex-
cludes them only from an estimation of the moral 
worth of actions. Kant gave the coup de grace to all 
sentimentality which had taken the lead in ethical 
questions too long. Mr. Spencer says: 
'' If those acts only have moral worth which are done from 
" a sense of duty * * * we must say that a man's moral 
"worth is greater in proportion as the strength of his sense of 
"du ty is such that he does the right thing not only apart from 
"inclination but against inclination. According to Kant, then, 
" t h e most moral man is the man * * * who says of another 
" that which is true though he would like to injure him by a false-
"hood; who lends money to his brother though he would prefer to 
"see him in distress." 
Schiller, although an admirer of Kant, makes in 
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28 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
his Xenions a similar objection to this corollary of the 
ethics of pure reason. He says: 
" Willingly serve I my friends; but 'tis pity, I do it with pleasure. 
And I am really vexed, that there's no virtue in me!" 
And he answers in a second distich: 
" There is no other advice than that you try to despise friends, 
And, with disgust, you will do what such a duty demands." 
The difficulty is removed under the following con-
sideration: A man with good inclinations is less ex-
posed to temptation than a man with bad inclinations. 
If both act morally under conditions otherwise the 
same, the latter has shown greater strength of moral 
purpose than the former. The former's character (viz., 
his inherited inclinations and habits which represent 
the sum total of the moral energies of his ancestors,) 
is more moral than that of the latter. But the latter 
deserves more credit than the former for overcom-
ing the temptation; he has in this special act shown 
more moral strength of will than his more fortunate 
and morally higher advanced fellow-man. To those 
who have accepted the Kantian view, Mr. Spencer's 
and Schiller's objection can serve as a warning, not to 
lose sight of emotions altogether. Man is not only a 
reasonable being, he is at the same time a feeling 
creature. The instinctive faculties of man, the so-
called subconscious states, are the basis of his con-
sciousness. They form the roots of his soul from 
which spring the clear conceptions of his reason. The 
more man's habits and inclinations agree with morals, 
the more strength of purpose is left for further ethical 
advancement and moral progress. 
Similar objections have also been made to Kant's 
mechanical explanation of the origin of the planetary 
systems and milky ways. It seemed as if the divin-
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THE ETHICS OF KANT. 29 
ity of nature were replaced by the rigid law of grav-
ity. In his poem "The God's of Greece," Schiller 
complains: 
" Ftthllosselbst far ihres Kanstlers Ehre, 
Gleich dera todten Schlag der Pendeluhr, 
Dient sie knechtisch dem Gesetz der Schwere, 
Die entgOtterte Natur." 
" Dead even to her Master's praise, 
Like lifeless pendulum's vibration, 
Lo, godless Nature now obeys, 
Slave-like, the law of gravitation." * 
Such objections are always raised when a scientific 
explanation destroys the mystic view that a spirit or 
at least something unexplainable is the supposed 
cause of certain phenomena. Our sentiments are so 
closely connected and intimately interwoven with our 
errors that truth appears hostile to sentiment, and it 
becomes difficult to part with errors sanctified by 
emotion. Sentimentality always complains that clear 
thought is an enemy of romanticism, and romanticism 
is the only possible poetry to the taste of the senti-
mental. 
Now it cannot be denied that a one-sided 
knowledge not only appears rigid, it truly is so, and will 
be destructive of such emotions as reverence, awe, 
aesthetic taste, religion and art. Criticism is a most 
essential feature of science and philosophy, and how 
negative, how desolate and melancholy appear the 
results of criticism! But the pruning process of crit-
icism is very wholesome, and true science will only 
profit by discarding the vagueness of indistinct concep-
tions. Alpine lakes that are really deep can only gain 
by lucidity. Thus the clearness of genuine science 
and broad philosophy will only show the depth of 
truth into which by all its lucidity our emotions can 
* Slightly altered from B. W. BALL'S translation in THE OPEN COURT, p. 83. 
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30 THE ETHICS OF KANT. 
plunge without ever finding it shallow or fathoming 
it in all its profundity. 
Kant's doctrine of ethics is a truth that can stand 
the severest test. 
Ethics, in the sense of the word as used by Kant, 
can be found in man only, in so far as be is a reasona-
ble being. A truly reasonable being does not allow 
himself to be guided by impulses but is led by maxims. 
Inclinations and habits are remnants of instinct. Not 
he who in instinctive good-naturedness acts morally, 
is the ethical man, but he who deliberately and con-
sciously considers himself a representative of the gen-
eral order of things. The man, who adopts such 
maxims as can become universal principles, identifies 
his will with the laws of the universe. Man's moral 
dignity must not be sought in vague feelings or in in-
stinctive inspirations; it is based upon his reason and 
is developed in so far only as he makes use of his 
reason. 
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 7, 2015
http://m
onist.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
IN CRITICISM OF MR. H E R B E R T SPENCER'S PRESEN-
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T T is very strange that Mr. Herbert Spencer will again 
•*• and again attack the philosophy and ethics of 
Kant for views which Kant never held.* It is pos-
sible that there are disciples of Kant who deny the 
theory of evolution. Yet it is certain that Kant him-
self is not guilty of this mistake. Thinkers who re-
ject the theory of evolution are in this respect as little 
entitled to call themselves disciples of Kant as, for 
instance, the Sadducees were to call themselves follow-
ers of Christ. Kantian philosophy was foremost in the 
recognition of the need of evolution, and that at a time 
when public interest was not as yet centered upon it. 
Mr. Spencer's merits in the propagation of the theory 
of evolution are undeniable, and he deserves our warm-
est respect and thanks for the indefatigable zeal he has 
shown in the performance of this great work, for the 
labors he has undergone, and the sacrifices he has made 
for it. Yet recognising all that Mr. Spencer has done, 
we should not be blind to the fact that Kant's concep-
tion of evolution is even at the present day more in 
conformity with the facts of natural science than Mr. 
Spencer's philosophy, although the latter commonly 
goes by the name of the philosophy of evolution. 
It is painful to note that in many places where Mr. 
Spencer refers to Kant's philosophy, he does it slight-
ingly, as though Kant were one of the most irrational 
of thinkers. Kant's reasoning is denounced as " a b -
normal" and "vicious." I find such phrases as, " I t 
* See Mr. Spencer's article in Mind, No LIX, p. 313. 
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34 KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
is a vice of Kant's philosophy ,." " I f Kant had 
known more of Man than he did " etc. Mr. 
Spencer characterises Kant's method as follows : 
" Instead of setting out with a proposition of which the nega-
tive is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of which the 
affirmation is inconceivable, and proceeds to draw conclusions 
therefrom." 
These attacks of Mr. Spencer on Kant are not-jus-
tifiable. Kant is not guilty of the faults for which he 
is arraigned by Mr. Spencer. 
* 
* He 
It is, however, fair to state that these misunder-
standings appear excusable if the difficulties are borne 
in mind with which the English student of Kant is 
confronted. First, Kant cannot be understood without 
taking into consideration the historical development 
of his philosophy, and, secondly, most translations of 
the fundamental terms, he employs, are so misleading 
that errors can scarcely be avoided. 
Kant's philosophy is by no means a perfected sys-
tem ; it rather represents (as perhaps necessarily all 
philosophies do) the development of a thinker's mind. 
The "Critique of Pure Reason " especially shows traces 
of the state of Kant's mind at different periods, and 
thus it is that we discover passages which closely 
considered will be found to be contradictory. When 
reading this remarkable work we feel like travelers 
walking over the petrified relics of a powerful eruption. 
There are strata of ideas of the oldest formation close 
to the thoughts of a recent date. There are also ves-
tiges of intermediate phases. Here they stand in the 
petrification of printed words, peacefully side by side, 
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KANT ON EVOLUTION. 35 
as memorials of a great revolution in the development 
of human thought. It is this state of things which 
more than anything else makes of Kant's writings such 
difficult reading. At the same time it is obvious that 
we cannot simply take the results of Kant's philosophy ; 
we must follow him in the paths by which he arrived 
at any given proposition. 
There is no philosopher that has been worse mis-
interpreted than Kant; and the English interpreters of 
Kant have succeeded in mutilating his best thoughts so 
that this hero of progress appears as a stronghold of 
antiquated views. Mistranslations or misconceptions 
of his terms are to a great extent the cause of this 
singular fate. As an instance we mention the errors 
that attach to Kant's term Anschauung. Anschauung 
is the present object of our senses ; it is the impression 
a man has from looking at a thing and might have 
been translated by "perception" or perhaps "sen-
sation." It is usually translated by "intuition." The 
Anschauung of objects comprises the data of knowl-
edge, and they are previous to our reflection upon 
them. An intuition in the sense of the English In-
tuitionalists is denned as " a presentation which can 
be given previously to all thought," yet this presenta-
tion is supposed to be a kind of revelation, a knowledge 
that comes to us without our contemplation, a cogni-
tion the character of which is immediate as well as 
mysterious ; in short something that is supernatural. 
How different is Kant's philosophy, for instance, if 
his position with reference to time and space is mis-
taken ! "T ime and Space are our Anschauung," Kant 
says. But his English translators declare: " Kant 
maintained that space and time are intuitions." What 
a difference it makes if intuition is interpreted in the 
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36 KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
sense applied to it by the English Intuitionalist School 
instead of its being taken in the original meaning of 
the word Anschauung. 
* 
* * 
Any one who knows Kant through Mr. Spencer's 
representations only, must look upon him as having 
the most perverse mind that could possibly exist; and 
yet it is Kant from whom Spencer has indirectly de-
rived the most characteristic feature of his philosophy. 
What is Mr. Spencer's agnosticism but a popularisa-
tion of Kant's view that things in themselves are un-
knowable ? 
We conclude from the animosity which Mr. Spen-
cer shows toward Kant that he does not know how 
much in this respect he agrees with Kant, how much 
he has unconsciously imbibed from the Zeitgeist which 
in part was formed under the influence of this huge 
error of the great philosopher. 
I feel confident that any clear thinker who studies 
Kant and arrives along with him at the "thing in 
itself" will soon free himself from this error of Kan-
tian thought. Kant himself suggests to us the method 
by which we are to find the way out of agnosticism. 
As a proof I quote the views of two independent think-
ers ; both influenced by Kant's criticism but neither a 
blind follower. Professor Mach says : 
" I have always felt it as a special good fortune, that early in 
my life, at about the age of fifteen, I happened to find in the li-
brary of my father Kant's ' Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic. 
The book made at that time a powerful, ineffaceable impression 
upon me that I never afterwards experienced to the same degree 
in any of my philosophical reading. Some two or three years 
later I suddenly discovered the superfluous role that ' the thing in 
itself plays." The Monist, Vol. I, No. i, pp. 65 and 66. 
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And Schiller guided by similar considerations says 
in one of his Xenions : 
" Since Metaphysics, of late, without heirs to her fathers was gathered : 
Under the hammer are now ' things in themselves ' to be sold." 
The latest attack of Mr. Spencer upon Kantism is 
in the article "Our Space-Consciousness," in Mind, 
written in reply to Professor Watson. Mr. Spencer 
there repeats his misconception of Kantism, so that I 
feel urged to utter a few words of protest against his 
gross misrepresentation of Kant's views. I shall con-
fine myself mainly to quotations from Kant's works— 
and the passages quoted will speak for themselves. 
Should there indeed be any disciples of Kant who are, as 
Mr. Spencer says, " profoundly averse to that evolu-
tionary view which contemplates mind as having had 
a genesis conforming to laws like those conformed to 
by the genesis of the body," these quotations will suf-
fice to prove that they have misconstrued the views 
of their master. Philosophers hostile to the theory of 
evolution had better select another patron for their 
ideas. Kant is too radical a mind to protect those men 
who in the domains of thought give the signal for retreat. 
Mr. Spencer adopted the evolution theory as it was 
presented by Von Baer, who explains " Entwickelung" 
as a progress from the homogeneous to the heteroge-
neous. 
Baer's "Developmental History of Animals" was 
published in 1828. Mr. Spencer adopted the theory in 
1854. But the history of the theory of evolution is 
older than Von Baer's book. Professor Baer concludes 
his work with a few corollaries among which near the 
end we find the following passage : 
"If we survey the contents of the whole Scholia, there follows 
from them a general result, We found that the effect of genera-
tion continues to advance from a part to a whole [Schol. 2.] ; thaf 
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38 KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
in development, self-dependence increases in correspondence with 
its environment [Schol. 2.], as well as the determinateness of its 
structure [Schol. 1.] ; that in the internal development special 
parts shape themselves forth from the more general, and their dif-
ferentiation increases [Schol. 3.] ; that the individual, as the pos-
sessor of a fixed organic form, changes by degrees from more gen-
eral forms into more special [Schol. 5.]. 
" The general result of our inquiry and consideration can now 
well be declared as follows : 
"Tha t the developmental history of the individual is the 
history of increasing individuality in every relation; that is, 
Individual isation. 
"Th i s general conclusion is, indeed, so plain, that it needs no 
proof from observation, but seems evident a priori. But we be-
lieve that this evidentness is merely the stamp of truth, and there-
fore is its guarantee. Had the history "of development from the 
outset been perceived as just expressed, it could and should have 
been inferred, that the individual of a determinate animal type 
attains to this by changing from a general into a special form. 
But experience teaches everywhere, that deductions are always 
safer if their results are discovered beforehand hy observation. 
Mankind would have obtained a still greater intellectual possession 
than it really has, had this been otherwise. 
"Bu t if this general conclusion has truth and contents, it is 
one fundamental idea which runs through all forms and degrees of 
animal development, and governs every single relation. It is the 
same idea that collected in space the distributed particles into 
spheres and united them in solar systems; which caused the dis-
integrated dust on the surface of our metallic planet to grow up 
into living forms; but this idea is nothing else than life itself, and 
the words and syllables in which it expresses itself, are the different 
forms of life." 
These corollaries were not inserted by Baer be-
cause he intended to proclaim a new truth, but simply 
to excite a popular interest in a strictly scientific work, 
in order to extend the circle of its readers. Baer says 
in the preface : 
' ' So much about the first part. In order to procure for the 
•work readers and buyers, I have added a second part in which I 
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KANT ON .EVOLUTION. 39 
make some general remarks under the title of Scholia and Corol-
laries. They are intended to be sketches of the confession of my 
scientific faith concerning the development of animals, as it was 
formed from the observation of the chick and by other investiga-
tions." 
* 
* * 
The "Encyclopaedia Br i t ann ica" says of Baer that 
he " p r e p a r e d the way for Mr. Spencer 's generalisation 
of the law of organic evolution as the law of all evolu-
t i on . "* 
Baer declares that individualisation is " t h e one 
fundamental idea that goes through all the forms of 
cosmic and animal development ." The generality of 
the law of evolution is clearer in the language em-
ployed by Baer, in the full context of the Scholia than 
appears from the short statement of the "Encyclopaedia 
Br i tannica ." Nevertheless it is clear enough in the 
quoted passage that Baer made a statement of uni-
versal application. How can such a universal state-
ment be made more general ? 
W e must add here that Mr. Spencer and his dis-
ciples overvalue the importance of generalisation. It 
is not the power of generalisation that makes the 
philosopher and the scientist but the power of dis-
crimination. The habit of generalising whatever comes 
under our observation is very common among the 
uneducated and uncivilised, and almost nine tenths of 
human errors arise from unwarranted generalisations. 
*The passage in the Encyclopadia Britannica on Baer runs as follows: 
" In his Entwickelungsgeschichte dcr Thiere, p. 264, he distinctly tells us 
that the law of growing individuality is ' the fundamental thought which goes 
through all forms and degrees of animal development and all single relations. 
It is the same thought which collected in the cosmic space solar systems; the 
same which caused the weather-beaten dust on the surface of our metallic 
planet to spring forth living beings.' Von Baer thus prepared the way for 
M r. Spencer's generalisation of the law of organic evolution as the law of all 
evolution." 
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4o KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
In Kant's time the interest in the theory of evolu-
tion was confined to a few minds. It is well known 
that Goethe was one of its most enthusiastic support-
ers.* In the middle of the eighteenth century there 
were three views proposed to explain the origin and the 
development of organised beings: ( i) Occasionalism, 
(2) the theory of Evolution, and (3) the theory of Epi-
genesis. Occasionalism maintained that God created 
on each new occasion a new animal. The word evo-
lution was used in a different sense from that in which 
it is now understood : evolutionism, as maintained by 
Bonnet, Haller, and others, was the view that the 
sperma contained a very small specimen of the animal 
that was to grow from it. The hen's egg was sup-
posed to contain an excessively minute but complete 
chicken. The theory of epigenesis, however, pro-
pounded in 1759 by Caspar Friedrich Wolff in his 
"Theoria Generationis," explained development by 
additional growth, and it is this theory of epigenesis 
which later on, after the total defeat of the old evolu-
tionism, was called (but improperly) the evolution 
theory. The word "evolution" has thus again admitted 
the erroneous idea of an unfolding. 
In Kant's time the battle between the occasionalists, 
the evolutionists, and the adherents of the epigenesis 
theory was hot indeed ; and Kant unquestionably gave 
preference to the epigenesis theory. The most im-
portant passage on the subject appears in his "Cri-
tique of Judgment." It is as follows : 
" If now the teleological principle of the generation of organ-
ised beings be accepted, as it would be, we can account for their in-
ternally adapted form either by Occasionalism or by Prestabilistii.\ 
* See Haeckel, Goethe on Evolution, No. 131 of The Open Court. 
t Prcestabilismus, that is, the theory that the phenomena of nature are the 
result of pre-established law. 
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KANT ON EVOLUTION. 41 
According to the first, the supreme world-cause would, in agree-
ment with its idea, on the occasion of every coition directly give the 
proper organic form to the material thereby blended ; according to 
the second, it would have implanted into the original products of 
its designing wisdom merely the power by means of which an or-
ganic being produces its like and the species itself is constantly 
maintained and likewise the death of individuals is continually re-
placed by their own nature, which is operating at the same time 
for their destruction. 
" If we assume occasionalism for the production of organised 
beings, nature is thereby wholly discarded,- and with it the use of 
reasoning in determining the possibility of such kinds of products ; 
therefore, it cannot be supposed that this system is accepted by any 
one who has had to do with philosophy." 
"As to Prcstabilism, it can proceed in a two-fold manner, 
namely, it considers every organic being produced by its like, either 
as the educt or as the product of the first. The system which con-
siders generated beings as mere educts is called that of individual 
preformation, or also the theory of evolution; that which makes 
generated beings products is named the system of epigenesis. The 
latter can also be called a system of generic preformation, because 
the productive power of those generating was virtually preformed 
to agree with the internal adapted arrangements that fell to the lot 
of their race. The opposing theory to this view should be named 
that of individual preformation, or still better, the theory of evolu-
tion." 
" The defenders of the theory of evolution, who exempt each 
individual from the formative power of nature, in order to derive 
the same directly from the hand of the Creator, would not dare to 
permit this to happen in accordance with the hypothesis of occa-
sionalism, so that coition would be a mere formality, a supreme 
national world-cause having decided to form every particular foetus 
by direct interference, and to resign to the mother only its develop-
ment and nourishment. They declared themselves in favor of pre-
formation, as though it luere not the same to make the required forms 
arise in a supernatural manner at the beginning of the world, as 
during its progress ; and as if a great multitude of supernatural ar-
rangements would not rather be dispensed with through occasional 
creation which were necessary in order that the embryo formed at 
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4 2 KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
the beginning of the world should, throughout the long period up 
to its development, not suffer from the destructive forces of nature, 
but endure and maintain itself intact; moreover, an immensely 
greater number of such preformed beings would be made than ever 
would be developed, and with them as many creations be thus ren-
dered unnecessary and purposeless. They still, however, resign at 
least something to nature, in order not to fall in with complete hy-
perphysics, which can dispense with explanation from nature. They 
still held fast indeed, to their hyperphysics; even finding in mon-
sters (which it must be impossible to regard as designs of nature) 
cases of adaptation which call for admiration, although the only 
purpose of that adaptedness might be to make an anatomist take 
offence at it as a purposeless adaptedness, and have a sense of mel-
ancholy admiration. Yet they could not well fit the generation of 
hybrids into the system of preformation, but were obliged still fur-
ther to endow the sperm of male creatures with a designedly acting 
power, whereas they had otherwise accorded it nothing except me-
chanical force to serve as the first means of nourishment of the 
embryo ; yet this designedly acting force, in the case of the products 
of generation between two creatures of the same kind, they would 
grant to neither of them. 
" I f on the contrary the great advantage was not at once re-
cognised which the theory of epigenesis possessed over the former 
in view of the experimental foundation on which the proof of it 
rested ; yet reason would be especially favorably predisposed from 
the outset for this mode of explanation, inasmuch as it regards na-
ture—with reference to the things which originally can be conceived 
as possible only in accordance with the theory of causality and de-
sign, at least so far as propagation is concerned—as self-producing 
and not merely as developing, and thus with the least possible em-
ployment of the supernatural, leaves all that comes afterwards, 
from the very beginning on, to nature : without concerning itself 
with the original beginning, with regard to the explanation of 
which physics in general miscarries, try with what chain of causes 
it may." 
Kant recognises neither the stability of species nor 
any fixed limits between them. And this one maxim 
alone suffices to prove that he was of the same opinion 
as the great biologist who wrote the "Origin of Spe-
cies." Kant says (Ed. Hart. III. p. 444): 
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KANT ON EVOLUTION. 43 
' ' Non datur vacuum formarum, that is, there are not different 
original and primitive species, which were, so to say, isolated and 
separated by an empty space from one another, but all the mani-
fold species are only divisions of a single, chief, and general 
species; and from this principle results again this immediate in-
ference : datur continuum formarum, that is, all differences of 
species border on each other, and allow no transition to one an-
other by a leap, but only through very small degrees of difference, 
by which we can arrive at one from another ; in one word, there 
are no species or sub-species which, according to reason, would be 
next each other in affinity, but intermediate species are always pos-
sible, whose difference from the first and second is less than their 
difference from one another." 
In Kant's "Critique of Judgment" (§. So) we find 
the following passage: 
" T h e agreement of so many species of animals, with refer-
ence to a definite, common scheme, which appears not only to be 
at the foundation of their bony structure, but also of the arrange-
ment of their other parts, in which, by abridgment of one and 
prolongation of another, by envelopment of this and unfolding of 
that, a wonderful simplicity of plan has been able to produce so 
great a diversity of species—this agreement casts a ray of hope, 
although a weak one, in the mind, that here, indeed, something 
might be accomplished with the principle of the mechanism of na-
ture, without which in general there can be no physical science. 
' ' This analogy of forms, so far as they appear, notwithstand-
ing all their diversity, to be produced after the model of a common 
prototype, strengthens the conjecture of a real relationship be-
tween the same by generation from a common ancestral source, 
through the gradual approach of one animal species to another, 
from man, in whom the principle of design appears to be best 
proved, to the polyp, from this to the moss and lichen, and finally 
to the lowest stage of nature perceptible to us, to crude matter, 
from which and its forces, according to mechanical laws (like those 
which work in the production of crystals), the whole technic of na-
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44 KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
ture (which is so incomprehensible to us in organised beings that 
we imagine another principle is necessitated for their explanation) 
appears to be derived.* 
" T h e Archaeologist of nature is now free to make that great 
family of beings (for such we must conceive it, if the uninterrupted 
relationship is to have a foundation) arise out of the extant ves-
tiges of the oldest revolutions, following every mechanism known 
to him or which he can suppose." 
Kant adds in a foot-note : 
" An hypothesis of such a kind can be named a daring venture 
of reason, and there may be few of the most sagacious naturalists, 
through whose minds it has not sometimes passed. For it is not 
absurd, as the generatio cquivoca, by which is understood the pro-
duction of an organised being through the mechanical action of 
crude unorganised matter. But it would still be generatio vnivoca 
in the common understanding of the word, in so far only as some-
thing organic was produced out of another organic body, although 
specifically distinguished from it ; for instance, if certain aquatic 
animals by and by formed into amphibia, and from these after 
some generations into land animals. A priori this does not contra-
dict the judgment of pure reason. Only experience shows no ex-
ample thereof; according to it, rather, all generation which we 
know is generatio homonyma (not mere univoca in opposition to pro-
duction out of unorganised material), that is, the bringing forth of 
a product homogeneous in organisation, with the generator ; and 
generatio lieteronyma, so far as our actual experience of nature 
goes is nowhere met with." 
* The proposition that Kant is no easy reading found an unexpected and 
strong opposition. Immediately after the publication of this article, Sept. 4th, 
1890, Mr. Charles S. Peirce made the following incidental remark in a letter 
to the author dated Sept. 6th, 1890 : " I have heard too much of Kant's being 
hard reading. I think he is one of the easiest of philosophers; for he gen-
erally knows what he wants to say, which is more than half the battle, and 
he says it in terms which are very clear. Of course, it is quite absurd to try 
to read Kant without preliminary studies of Leibnizian and English philoso-
phers, as well as of the terminology of which Kant's is a modification or trans-
mogrification. But there is a way of making out what he meant, while such 
writers as Hume and J. S. Mill, the more you study them the more they puz-
z.e you." 
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The treatise " P r e s u m a b l e Origin of Human i ty , " 
Kant sums up in the following sentence : 
"From this representation of the earliest human history it re-
sults, that the departure of man from what, as the first abode of 
his kind, his judgment represented as Paradise, was no other than 
the transition of mere animal creatures out of barbarism into man, 
out of the leading-strings of instinct into the guidance of reason, 
in a word, out of the guardianship of nature into the state of free-
dom." 
In his work " U p o n the Different Races of Man-
kind," Kant discusses the origin of the species of man 
in a way which would do honor to a follower of Dar-
win. It is written in a spirit which recognises the 
difference of conditions as the causes that produce 
different species. W e select a few passages from this 
work. 
In a foot-note we read : 
"Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science (Naturbe-
sc/ireibung) and natural history in one and the same sense. But it 
is evident that the knowledge of natural phenomena, as they now 
are, always leaves to be desired the knowledge of that which they 
have been before how, and through what succession of modifications 
they have passed in order to have arrived, in every respect, at 
their present state. Natural History, which at present we almost 
entirely lack, would teach us the changes that have effected the 
form of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the 
earth (plants and animals) that they have suffered by natural 
transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the 
prototype of the original species that they have experienced. It 
would probably trace a great number of apparently different va-
rieties back to a species of one and the same kind, and would con-
vert the present so intricate school-system of Natural Science into 
a natural system in conformity with reason." 
W e adduce another passage, no less remarkable in 
clearness, which proves that Kant has a very definite 
idea, not only of the gradual evolution of man, but also 
of the survival of the fittest: 
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46 KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
" The cry which a child scarcely born utters, has not the tone 
of misery, but of irritation, and violent rage; not the result of 
pain, but of vexation about something ; probably for the reason 
that it wishes to move itself and feels its incapacity, like a captive 
when freedom is taken from him. What purpose can nature 
have in providing that a child shall come with a loud cry into the 
world, which for it and the mother is, in the rude natural state, 
full of danger ? Since a wolf, a pig even, would in the absence of 
the mother, or through her feebleness owing to her delivery, be 
thus attracted to devour it. But no animal except man as he now 
is announces with noise its new-born existence ; which in the wis-
dom of nature appears to be arranged in order that the species shall 
be preserved. We must also assume that in what was an early 
epoch of nature for this class of animals (namely in the period of 
barbarism) this outcry of the child at its birth did not exist; con-
sequently only later on a second epoch appeared, after both par-
ents had arrived at that degree of civilisation which was required 
for home-life; yet without knowing how and by what interweaving 
causes nature arranges such a development. This remark leads us 
far ; for example, to the thought whether after the same epoch, 
still a third did not follow accompanied by great natural revolu-
tions, during which an orang-outang or a chimpanzee perfected 
the organs which serve for walking, for feeling objects, and for 
speech, and thus evolved the limb-structure of man ; in which ani-
mals was contained an organ for the exercise of the function of 
reason, which by social cultivation was gradually perfected and 
developed." 
Kant 's view concerning the origin of the biped man 
from quadruped animal ancestors is most unequivo-
cally stated. 
In a review of Dr. Moscati 's Lecture upon the dif-
ference of structure in animals and in men, Kant says : 
' ' Dr. Moscati proves that the upright walk of man is con-
strained and unnatural ; that he is indeed so constructed that he may 
be able to maintain and move in this position, but that, although by 
needful and constant habit he formed himself thus, inconvenience 
and disease arise therefrom, which sufficiently prove, that he was 
misled by reason and imitation to deviate from the first animal ar-
rangement. Man is not constructed internally different from other 
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animals that go on all fours. When now he raises himself his in-
testines, particularly the embryo of pregnant individuals, come into 
a pendulous situation and a half reversed condition, which, if it 
often alternates with the lying position or that on all-fours, cannot 
precisely produce specially evil consequences, but, by constant 
continuance, causes deformities and numerous diseases. Thus, for 
example, the heart, because it is compelled to hang free, elongates 
the blood vessels to which it is attached, assumes an oblique posi-
tion since it is supported by the diaphragm and slides with its end 
against the left side—a position wherein man, especially at full 
growth, differs from all other animals, and thereby receives an in-
evitable inclination to aneurism, palpitation, asthma, chest-dropsy, 
etc., etc. With the upright position of man the mesentery, pulled 
down by the weight of the intestines, sinks perpendicularly there-
under, is elongated and weakened, and prepared for numerous rup-
tures. In the mesenteric vein which has no valves, the blood moves 
slowly and with greater difficulty (it having to ascend against the 
course of gravity) than would happen with the horizontal position 
of the trunk. . . . " 
' ' We could add considerably to the reasons just adduced to 
show that our animal nature is really quadrupedal. Among all four-
footed animals there is not a single one that could not swim if it 
accidentally fell into the water. Man alone drowns, except in 
cases where he has learned to swim. The reason is because he 
has laid aside the habit of going on all-fours ; for it is by this mo-
tion that he would keep himself up in the water without the exer-
cise of any art, and by which all four-footed creatures, who other-
wise shun the water, swim. . . . " 
" It will be seen, accordingly, that the first care of nature was 
that man should be preserved as animal for himselj and his species, 
and for that end the position best adapted to his internal struc-
ture, to the lay of the fcetus, and to his preservation in danger, 
was the quadrupedal position ; we see, moreover, that a germ of 
reason is placed in him, whereby, after the development of the 
same, he is destined for social intercourse, and by the aid of which 
he assumes the position which is in every case the most fitted for 
this, namely, the bipedal position,—thus gaining upon the one 
hand infinite advantages over animals, but also, being obliged to 
put up with many inconveniences that result from his holding his 
head so proudly above his old companions." 
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[* In the double-leaded quotation on pages 43 and 44 
Kant speaks about the explanation of organised life from 
man down to the polyp " according to mechanical laws 
like those which work in the production of crystals ," 
and he adds, in organised beings the whole technic of 
nature is so incomprehensible to us " t h a t we imagine 
another principle is necessitated for their explanat ion." 
This " o t h e r principle " would be the principle of 
design, or the teleological explanation of phenomena. 
In his old age Kant inclined more to teleology than in 
his younger years, and it is for this reason that Pro-
fessor Erns t Haeckel accuses Kant of inconsistency. 
After having pointed out that " Kant is one of the 
few philosophers that combine a well-founded knowl-
edge of the natural sciences with extraordinary preci-
sion and depth of specu la t ion" and further that " h e 
was the first who taught ' the principle of the struggle 
for exis tence ' and ' t he theory of se lect ion. ' " Haeckel 
says in his " Natiirliche Schopfungsgeschichte," 8th 
edition, p. gi : 
" Wir wiirden daher unbedingt in der Geschichte der En t-
wickelungslehre unserem gewaltigen KiJnigsberger Philosophen den 
ersten Platz einriiumen mlissen, wenn nicht leider diese bewunderns-
wiirdigen monistischen Ideen des jungen Kant spiiter durch den 
uberw'altigenden Einfluss der dualistisch christlichen Weltanschau-
ung ganz zuriickgedrangt worden waren." 
T h i s " i n f l u e n c e of t h e d u a l i s t i c C h r i s t i a n w o r l d -
c o n c e p t i o n " i s a c c o r d i n g to H a e c k e l , K a n t ' s r e c o g n i -
t i o n of a t e l e o l o g i c a l c a u s a t i o n in t h e r e a l m of o r g a n -
i sed life. H a e c k e l s a y s on t h e s a m e p l a c e : 
" Er behauptet, dass sich im Gebiete der anorganischen Natur 
unbedingt siimmtliche Erscheinungen aus mechanischen Ursachen, 
* This passage on pages 48, 49, and 50 which is enclosed in brackets did not 
appear in The Open Court. It has been added since and is published here 
fur the first time. 
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KANT ON EVOLUTION. 49 
aus bewegenden Kraften der Materie selbst, erklaren lassen, im Ge-
biete der anorganischen Natur dagegen nicht." 
Haeckel does not stand alone in denouncing the old 
Kant. Schopenhauer distinguishes between the au-
thor of the first and the author of the second edition 
of the " Critique of Pure Reason," regarding the former 
only as the real Kant. These accusations are not with-
out foundation, but we believe with Max Muller that 
they have been unduly exaggerated. 
As to teleology for which Kant 's preference appears 
to be more strongly marked in his later than in his 
younger years we should say that it is a problem that 
should, in an historical investigation, as to whether or 
not Kant was a consistent evolutionist, be treated inde-
pendently. No one can deny that there is an adaptat ion 
to ends in the domain of organised life. It is not so 
much required to deny teleology in the domain of or-
ganised nature as to purify and critically sift our views 
of teleology. There is a kind of teleology which does 
not stand in contradiction to the causation of efficient 
causes so called. 
Mr. Spencer 's denunciations of Kant would have 
some foundation, if he had reference to the old Kant 
alone. But everyone who censures Kant for the errors 
of his later period is bound to qualify his statement, 
and indeed whenever such strictures of Kantism ap-
pear I find them expressly stated as having reference 
to " t h e old Kan t . " 
Tha t Kant who is a living power even to-day is the 
young Kant, it is the author of the first edition of the 
"Cr i t ique of Pure Reason." H e is generally called 
" t h e young K a n t , " although he was not young ; he 
was, as we say, in his best years. T h e old Kant who 
proclaimed that he " m u s t abolish knowledge in order 
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5° KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
to make room for faith " is a dead weight in our col-
leges and universities. The young Kant is positive, the 
old Kant is agnostic. The young Kant was an inves-
tigator and naturalist of the first degree ; he gave an im-
petus to investigation that it had never before received 
from philosophy. The old Kant, I should not exactly 
say reverted but certainly, neglected the principles of 
his younger years and thus became the leader of a re-
actionary movement from which sprang two offshoots 
very unlike each other but children of the same father; 
the Oxford transcendentalism as represented by Green 
and the English agnosticism as represented by Mr. 
Spencer. 
It is strange that Mr. Spencer has so little knowl-
edge concerning the evolution of the views he holds. 
If he were more familiar with the history of the idea 
" tha t the world-problem is insolvable, he would show 
more reverence toward the old Kant and his mystical 
inclinations ; for Kant, whatever Mr. Spencer may say 
against it, is the father of modern agnosticism.*] 
* 
* * 
The history of Mr. Spencer's philosophical devel-
opment shows that the first idea which' took posses-
sion of his mind and formed the centre of crystalisa-
tion for all his later views was M. Condorcet's optim-
ism. Condorcet believed in progress ; he was con-
vinced that in spite of all the tribulations and anxie-
* In this connection we call attention to a book, Kant und Darwin, tin 
Beitrag zur Gesckickte der Eniwickelungslehre, Jena, 1875, by Fritz Schultze, 
formerly Privat docent in Jena, now Professor of philosophy at the Polytechnic 
Institute in Dresden. This little book is a collection of the most important 
passages of Kant's views concerning evolution, the struggle for existence, and 
the theory of selection, and it is astonishing to find how much Kant had to 
say on the subject and how strongly he agrees with and anticipates Darwin. 
If Kant had not lived before Darwin one might be tempted to conclude that 
he was familiar with his Origin of Species and The Descent of Man. 
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KANT ON EVOLUTION. 5 1 
ties of the present, man would at last arrive at a state 
of perfection. He saw a millennium in his prophetic 
mind, which alas !—if the law of evolution be true— 
can never be realised. Condorcet died a martyr to his 
ideals. He poisoned himself in 1799 to escape death 
by the Guillotine. 
The influence of Condorcet's work Esquisse d'un 
tableau historique des progr'es de Vesprit humain is trace-
able not only in Mr. Spencer's first book, "Social 
Statics," published in 1850, but in all his later writ-
ings. How can a true evolutionist believe in the 
Utopia of a state of perfect adaptation? Does not 
each progress demand new adaptations? Take as an 
instance the change from walking on four feet to an 
upright gait. Did not this progress itself involve man 
in new difficulties, to which he had to adapt himself ? 
Let a labor-saving machine be invented, how many 
laborers lose their work and how many others are in 
demand ! The transition from one state to the other is 
not easy, and as soon as it is perfected new wants have 
arisen which inexorably drive humanity onward on 
the infinite path of progress which can never be lim-
ited by any state of perfection. There is a constant 
readjustment necessary, and if we really could reach a 
state of perfect adaptation human life would drop into 
the unconsciousness of mere reflex motions. 
Any one who understands the principle of evolu-
lution and its universal applicability, will recognise 
that there can be no standstill in the world, no state 
of perfect adaptation. Our solar system has evolved, 
as Kant explained in his "General Cosmogony and 
Theory of the Heavens," out of a nebula, and is going 
to dissolve again into a nebular state. So our social 
development consists in a constant realisation of ideals. 
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 7, 2015
http://m
onist.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
52 KANT ON EVOLUTION. 
We may think that if we but attain our next and dear-
est ideal, humanity will be satisfied forever. But as 
soon as we have realised that ideal, we quickly get ac-
customed to its benefits. It becomes a matter of 
course and another ideal higher still than that just 
realised appears before our mental gaze. 
Herder, in his "Ideas for a Philosophy of the His-
tory of Mankind," not unlike Mr. Spencer, was also 
under the spell of the Utopian ideal, that humanity 
will reach at last a state of perfect happiness. Kant, 
in his review of Herder's book, discusses the relativity 
of happiness and its insufficiency as a final aim of life. 
He says: 
"Firs t of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a child 
and of a youth, and lastly that of man ! In all epochs of human 
history, as well as among all classes and conditions of the same 
epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in exact conformity 
with the individual's ideas and the degree of his habituation to 
the conditions amid which he was born and raised. Indeed, it is 
not even possible to form a comparison of the degree of happiness 
nor to give precedence to one class of men or to one generation 
over another. . . . If this shadow-picture of happiness . . . . were 
the actual aim of Providence, every man would have the measure 
of his own happiness within him. . . . Does the author (Herder) 
think perhaps that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheiti had never 
been visited by more civilised peoples and were ordained to live 
in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come—that we 
could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they should 
exist at all, and whether it would not have been just as well that 
this island should be occupied by happy sheep and cattle as that 
it should be inhabited by men who are happy only through pure 
enjoyment ? " 
" It involves no contradiction to say that no individual mem-
ber of all the offspring of the human race, but that only the spe-
cies, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung). The mathematician 
may explain the matter in his way. The philosopher would say : 
the mission of the human race as a whole is unceasing progress, 
and the perfection (Vollendung) of this mission is a mere idea (al-
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KANT ON EVOLUTION. 53 
though in every aspect a very useful one) of the aim towards which, 
in conformity with the design of providence, we are to direct our 
endeavors." 
It is indubitable that Kant's views of evolution 
agree better with the present state of scientific inves-
tigation, than does Mr. Spencer's philosophy, which 
has never been freed from Condorcet's ingenuous op-
timism. The assumption of a final state of perfection 
by absolute adaptation is irreconcilable with the idea 
of unceasing progress, which must be true, if evolution 
is a universal law of nature. 
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